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In various texts (e.g., Met. Z.17), Aristotle assigns priority to form, in its role as a
principle and cause, over matter and the matter-form compound. Given the central
role played by this claim in Aristotle’s search for primary substance in the Meta-
physics, it is important to understand what motivates him in locating the primary
causal responsibility for a thing’s being what it is with the form, rather than the
matter. According toMet. Θ.8, actuality [energeia/entelecheia] in general is prior to
potentiality [dunamis] in three ways, viz., in denition, time and substance. I pro-
pose an explicitly causal reading of this general priority claim, as it pertains to the
matter-form relationship. e priority of form over matter in denition, time and
substance, in my view, is best explained by appeal to the role of form as the formal,
ecient and nal cause of the matter-form compound, respectively, while the pos-
teriority ofmatter to form according to all three notions of priority ismost plausibly
accounted for by the fact that the causal contribution of matter is limited to its role
as material cause. When approached from this angle, the work ofMet. Θ.8 can be
seen to lend direct support to the more specic and explicitly causal priority claim
we encounter inMet. Z.17, viz., that form is prior tomatter in its role as the principle
and primary cause of a matter-form compound’s being what it is.
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1. Introduction
In various texts, Aristotle assigns priority to form, in its role as a principle
and cause, over matter and the matter-form compound.1is alleged causal
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sity of Alberta, 2-40 Assiniboia Hall, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2E7, Canada. Email:
kathrin.koslicki@ualberta.ca.
1 At Phys. II.1, 193b6–12, for example, Aristotle states that the form of a natural matter-form
compound ismore properly considered its nature than thematter. Anature, in this context,
is characterized as an internal principle of change and stability within a natural matter-
form compoundwhich accounts for the various kinds of changesmatter-form compounds
can undergo: substantial change (viz., coming to be or ceasing to be), qualitative change
(viz., alteration), quantitative change (viz., growth and decrease) and change with respect
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priority of form plays an important role in the conception of substance Aris-
totle develops in the middle books of theMetaphysics, viz.,Met. ZHΘ.e
fact that form, in Aristotle’s view, is causally prior, to matter and the com-
pound weighs heavily in favor of his assessment that form comes out as the
primary contender for the role of substance, more so than matter and the
compound:
erefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which
thematter is somedenite thing; and this is the substance of the thing.
(Met. Z.17, 1041b7–9)2
And this [the form] is the substance of each thing; for this is the pri-
mary cause of its being; and since, while some things are not sub-
stances, asmany as are substances are formed naturally and by nature,
their substance would seem to be this nature, which is not an element
but a principle. An element is that into which a thing is divided and
which is present in it as matter, e.g. a and b are the elements of the
syllable. (Met. Z.17, 1041b27–33)
But the matter and the compound, as Aristotle tells us in other texts,
also function as causes and principles in various respects.3 e question
thus arises as to why form should be regarded as prior tomatter or the com-
pound in its role as a principle and cause? Given the centrality of this claim
for Aristotle’s conception of substance in theMetaphysics, it is important to
understandwhatmotivates him in locating the primary causal responsibility
for a thing’s being what it is with its form.
My main focus in this paper is on the question of why Aristotle desig-
nates the form of a matter-form compound, rather than the matter, as the
primary principle and cause of the compound’s being what it is. But this
larger question can be further claried by distinguishing the following two
to place (viz., locomotion). My starting-point, in this paper, will be Aristotle’s remarks in
Met. Z.17 concerning the priority of form over matter in its role as a principle and cause.
2 is and all subsequent passages from theMetaphysics come from the translation byW. D.
Ross (see Barnes 1984).
3 For example, in the context of Aristotle’s analysis of change in Phys. I, both the matter
and the matter-form compound are characterized as principles in their role as subjects of
change: the matter is that which underlies substantial change; and the matter-form com-
pound is that which underlies qualitative, quantitative and locomotive change. Moreover,
even though the form of a matter-form compound, according to Phys. II.1, 193b6–12, is
said to be its nature more so than the matter, the matter is nevertheless also designated as
a nature of the matter-form compound in Phys. II.1, i.e., as an internal principle of change
and stability, and as the material cause in Phys. II.3. In addition to their role in Aristotle’s
analysis of change, both the matter and the matter-form compound are also said to func-
tion as subjects of predication (e.g., Met. Z.3). For a classic discussion of Aristotle’s four
causes, in relation to Plato’s forms-as-causes doctrine, see (Fine 1987).
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more specic sub-questions. e rst asks what sorts of causal roles Aris-
totle ascribes to form, as compared to matter, such that form at the end of
the day, in Aristotle’s ranking, comes out as causally prior to matter. e
second presupposes a certain answer to the rst more specic sub-question
and then proceeds to ask why, in Aristotle’s view, it is the form, rather than
the matter, which occupies the causal roles in question. I take myself, in this
paper, to be addressing both of these more specic sub-questions. Aristo-
tle’s position in Met. Z.17 is that form is the primary cause and principle
of a matter-form compound’s being what it is. To my mind, both the con-
tent of this claim and Aristotle’s motivation for holding it must be unpacked
further in order to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the positionAris-
totle advances inMet. Z.17, as well as in his investigation into substance in
Metaphysics ZHΘ as a whole.us, in what follows, I attempt to shed light
both on the question of what sorts of causal roles Aristotle ascribes to form,
when he declares form to be the primary cause and principle of a matter-
form compound’s being what it is; and on the question of why it is the form
of a matter-form compound, rather than its matter, which accomplishes this
causal work, in Aristotle’s view.
2.1 e Posteriority of the Matter-Form Compound4
Although this interpretation is no doubt controversial, I read Aristotle as
having already disqualied matter-form compounds from primary sub-
stance status by the time he arrives at his more considered views concern-
ing substance in Metaphysics ZHΘ. At this point in his investigation, the
real competitors are now matter and form, viz., the principles and causes
of matter-form compounds. is development is of course surprising es-
pecially when evaluated against the background of the Categories, where,
as is well-known, Aristotle classies concrete particular objects (e.g., indi-
vidual living organisms) as primary substances. e Categories, however,
is generally taken to be one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of Aristotle’s
written works. When we turn to such texts as the Physics, De Anima and
theMetaphysics, in contrast, we notice that Aristotle’s views have undergone
a denitive shi and he now regards his previous ontological frontrunners
as further analyzable into explanatorily more basic constituents, viz., their
matter and their form. Although we still nd Aristotle referring to concrete
particular objects as substances (ousiai), even once his hylomorphic analysis
is on the table, these entities have apparently forfeited their status as primary
substances and are now classied as posterior or secondary, due to their par-
ticular brand ofmetaphysical complexity. Aristotle expresses this sentiment,
4 e issues treated in this section are discussed in greater detail in (Koslicki 2014).
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for example, in the following remark fromMet. Z.3:
e substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may
be dismissed; for it is posterior and its nature is obvious. (Met. Z.3,
1029a30–32)
While matter-form compounds gure saliently in our common-sense
experience of the world, they constitute for Aristotle merely the starting-
point, but by no means the end-point, of metaphysical inquiry:
It is agreed that there are some substances among sensible things, so
that we must look rst among these. For it is in an advantage to ad-
vance to that which is more intelligible. For learning proceeds for all
in this way—through that which is less intelligible by nature to that
which is more intelligible; and just as in conduct our work is to start
from what is good for each and make what is good in itself good for
each, so it is our work to start fromwhat is more intelligible to oneself
and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to oneself. (Met.
Z.3, 1029a33–4, 1029b3–12)5
Once these experientially salient objects have been subjected to further
metaphysical analysis, the explanatorily more basic constituents into which
they have been “dissolved”, viz., their matter and form, are now in a better
position to qualify for the title, “substance”, than the concrete particular ob-
jects themselves of which they are the principles and causes.
When Aristotle continues to refer to matter-form compounds as sub-
stances, even while in the same breath designating them as explanatorily
posterior or secondary, I take him to be employing his term, “ousia”, in a
primarily taxonomic way, i.e., to single out certain kinds of being, without
5 e manuscripts place the passage starting with “For it is an advantage to advance. . . ” and
ending with “. . . and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to oneself ” (1029b3–
1029b12) at the beginning of Aristotle’s discussion of essence inMet. Z.4, rather than at the
end of his remarks concerning subjecthood inMet. Z.3. Commentators, however, tend to
view the passage as misplaced there, since it lacks continuity with the rst few lines ofMet.
Z.4 (1029b1–3), and nd that it makes better sense when inserted, as above, betweenMet.
Z.3, 1029a34, and Met. Z.4, 1029b1–3. We cannot very well assume that Aristotle would
characterize essence as an easily accessible starting-point for human inquirers who are en-
gaged in an investigation concerning substance. In addition, we are told at 1029a32–33 that
form, which is in the subsequent chapters identied with essence, is dicult to under-
stand and must be investigated further. us, the canned remark characterizing learning
as a progression from “what is more intelligible to us” to “what is more intelligible by na-
ture”, which we nd elsewhere as well, is most straightforwardly interpreted here as refer-
ring to sensible substances, i.e., matter-form compounds. Aristotle’s statement at 1029a32
that “matter is also in a sense manifest (phanera)”, however, remains puzzling. For further
discussion concerning the placement and interpretation of this passage, see for example
(Bostock 1994, 80–85), (Burnyeat 1979, 16), (Burnyeat 2001, 16–18), (Frede and Patzig 1988,
49–56), and (Ross 1924, 166).
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thereby simultaneously committing himself to the idea that these entities
must be assigned the most privileged ontological position within his ontol-
ogy. Given this taxonomic use of the notion of substance, matter-form com-
pounds are labeled by Aristotle as substances simpliciter, using the notion of
substance in an absolute, i.e., non-relational and non-comparative, way. In
contrast, when Aristotle designates the form of a matter-form compound as
the primary contender for the role of substancemore so than thematter, as he
does inMet. Z.17, I read him as employing the notion of substance there in
both a relational and a comparativeway: in a relational way, since he regards
the form of a matter-form compound as the substance of the matter-form
compound; and in a comparative way, since form, in Aristotle’s view, qual-
ies for the title, “substance”, more so than matter does.6 On my reading,
Aristotle puts to use his notion of substance in these latter two ways (i.e.,
relationally and comparatively) not merely taxonomically, to single out cer-
tain kinds of being (viz., matter and form); rather, he is also indicating a cer-
tain non-taxonomic priority ranking, according to which matter and form,
as the principles and causes of matter-form compounds, occupy explana-
torily a more privileged position within his ontology than the matter-form
compounds with which they are associated.
For these reasons (as indicated here only very briey), I take it that
matter-form compounds, at this point in Aristotle’s investigation into sub-
stance in Metaphysics ZHΘ, are no longer considered to be the main con-
tenders for the title, “primary substance”. e new frontrunners are now
their principles and causes, viz., matter and form, the substances of matter-
form compounds. e really pressing question on Aristotle’s mind in Met.
Z.17, which has occupied him throughout Met. Z, is whether and why it
is the form of a matter-form compound that is more deserving of primary
substance status than the matter, according to a comparative, relational and
non-taxonomic use of the notion of substance.
2.2 Met. Z.17: Form as Principle and Primary Cause of Being
In Met. Z.17, the nal chapter of Met. Z, Aristotle sets out on a fresh start,
one of several such new beginnings we encounter along the way inMet. Z.
6 As I argue in (Koslicki 2014), it is not at all obvious that we should read Aristotle as also
wanting to take the further step and classify form as substance simpliciter (according to a
non-taxonomic and absolute use of the notion of substance). is strategy appears runs
afoul of a principle Aristotle endorses inMet. Z.13, according to which no substance can
have other substances present in it actually (see 1039a2–14). At the end of the day, then,
we may end up with an ontology in which there are no primary substances simpliciter in
the non-taxonomic sense, since the most privileged position within this ontology is oc-
cupied by a type of entity, viz., form, which qualies for primary substance status non-
taxonomically only in a relational, and not in an absolute, sense.
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e question he is pursuing in this chapter, as well as elsewhere inMet. Z, is
“What andwhat sort of thing is substance?”. His strategy here is to attempt to
answer this question by following the lead, “substance is a principle (arche¯)
and a cause (aitia)”:
We should say what, and what sort of thing, substance is, taking an-
other starting-point; [. . . ]. Since, then, substance is a principle (arche¯)
and a cause (aitia), let us attack it from this standpoint. (1041a6–10)
A cause, Aristotle tells us, is what is stated in response to certain kinds
of “why”-questions. e particular “why”-questions which are of primary
interest to Aristotle inMet. Z.17 appear to be, at least initially, of the form:
“Why is a certain kind of thing the kind of thing that it is?” or “Why is
something the kind of thing that it is?”, e.g., “Why is a house a house?” or
“Why is something that is a house a house?”. Rephrasing these questions in
a somewhat dierent way, we might put the main issue with which Aristotle
is concerned in this chapter as follows: “Whatmakes something the kind of
thing that it is (e.g., a house)?” or “In virtue of what is a thing the kind of
thing that it is (e.g., a house)?”. I interpret these questions as askingwhether a
thing’s membership in the kind to which it essentially belongs can be further
explained in terms of anything else about the thing in question.7e correct
answer to these questions, in Aristotle’s mind, is one which states the cause
of a thing’s being what it is (e.g., a house, a human being, a syllable, or esh);
and this, so Aristotle argues in this chapter, is the essence of the thing:8
Plainly we are seeking the cause (to aition). And this is the essence
(to ti e¯n einai) (to speak abstractly (logiko¯s)), which in some cases is
that for the sake of which, e.g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed,
and in some cases is the rst mover; for this also is a cause. But while
the ecient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the
nal cause is sought in the case of being also. (Met. Z.17, 1041a27–32)
7 Here, it is important to keep in mind that Aristotle oen nds it easier to illustrate what
he wants to say about natural things, in particular living organisms, by means of examples
involving artifacts (e.g., houses or syllables). Somewhat frustratingly, Aristotle engages in
this practice even when he does not believe that the claims in question really, at the end
of the day, apply to artifacts. We are told atMet. Z.17, 1041b28–30, that “while some things
are not substances, as many as are substances are formed naturally and by nature”; and, at
Met. Z.16, 1040b5–16, that even the parts of living organisms as well as the so-called simple
bodies or elements (e.g., earth, air, water and re) are now excluded from substance status,
despite their appearance on the initial list of reputable substance candidates given inMet.
Z.2. e disanalogies between artifacts and living organisms in Aristotle are discussed
further in (Koslicki 1997).
8 Why the cause and not a cause? Aer all, following Aristotle’s famous doctrine of the
four causes, we might expect that there is more than one acceptable answer to the “why”-
questions at issue. We will have occasion to take up this issue in more detail below.
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Aristotle’s discussion inMet. Z.17 suggests that he intends the model he
has set out for scientic inquiry in the Posterior Analytics to carry over to the
present metaphysical examination.9 According to the approach to scientic
theorizing Aristotle develops in the Posterior Analytics, a scientist is in a po-
sition to produce the correct answer to a scientic “why”-question, such as
“Why (in general) does thunder occur?”, once she has grasped the essence
of the phenomenon under consideration, i.e., once she knows what the cor-
rect answer is to questions of the form, “What is thunder?” or “What is it
to be thunder?”. Both types of questions, in Aristotle’s view, are correctly
answered by stating the cause, represented by the so-called “middle term”
in the accompanying demonstrative syllogism. us, the question, “Why
(in general) does thunder occur?”, receives the answer, “Because re is ex-
tinguished in the clouds”, which in this case states the ecient cause of the
phenomenon under consideration (re being extinguished in the clouds).
e question, “What is (it to be) thunder?”, is answered by giving the full
denition, or statement of the essence, of thunder, viz., “under is a kind
of noise in the clouds caused by the extinction of re”. Once a scientist has
grasped the essence of thunder, she can then also explain what (in general)
is required for thunder to occur, viz., remust be extinguished in the clouds;
the resulting noise in the clouds that is produced by the extinction of re is
thunder.10
It is not immediately obvious that the metaphysical “why”-questions
Aristotle is considering in Met. Z.17 are amenable to the model for scien-
tic inquiry he lays out in the Posterior Analytics. One of Aristotle’s con-
cerns in Met. Z.17 is that the metaphysical “why”-questions under discus-
sion might appear trivial, since one might mistakenly take them to be of the
form, “Why is something the same thing as itself?”. To put this triviality
worry to rest, Aristotle argues that the metaphysical “why”-questions at is-
sue, despite appearances, are really of the form, “Why does one thing belong
to another (distinct) thing?”. If this result can be established, so Aristotle
9 To justify this proposed conception of the relationship betweenAristotle’s scientic project
in the Posterior Analytics and his metaphysical concerns in Met. Z.17 properly would of
course require signicant work which I cannot hope to accomplish within the connes of
the present discussion.
10 Very briey, I see denitions, explanations, essences and causes as being related in Aris-
totle as follows. Denitions gure as rst principles or axioms in demonstrations, which,
according to the theory of scientic reasoning laid out in the Posterior Analytics, are the
proper syllogistic vehicle bymeans of which scientic explanations can, and perhaps ought
to be, conveyed. As I read Aristotle, the explanatory force of denitions is underwritten by
the causal power of essences, viz., the worldly (i.e., non-linguistic) correlates of denitions.
I investigate these issues in more detail in (Koslicki 2012). We will have further occasion
below to consider the sense in which Aristotelian essences do genuine causal work.
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reasons, then the metaphysical “why”-questions at issue would involve the
predication of one thing of another (distinct) thing and the triviality worry
is thereby avoided, on the assumption that it is never trivial to predicate one
thing of another (distinct) thing.
One might wonder whether the scientic “why”-questions with which
Aristotle is concerned in the Posterior Analytics, e.g., “Why does thunder
occur?”, are also supposed to be of the form, “Why does one thing belong to
another (distinct) thing?”, given the strong connection I see between Aristo-
tle’s scientic and his metaphysical projects. Aristotle indicates at 1041a24–
26 that the point does apply to the scientic case as well: he tells us there
that, when we ask such questions as “Why does thunder occur?” or “Why is
sound produced in the clouds?”, the inquiry in question concerns the pred-
ication of one thing of another (distinct) thing. I take it that, by requiring
the statements in question to be of the form, “One thing belongs to another
(distinct) thing”, Aristotle is at least in part stating a minimal predicational
requirement that is imposed on statements in order for them to be eligible to
occur in a demonstrative syllogism. Such statements must at least be of the
form, “One thing belongs to another (distinct) thing” (e.g., “Not twinkling
belongs to planets”). In addition, as we know from the Posterior Analytics,
statements which are eligible to occur in a demonstrative syllogism must of
course satisfy other requirements as well. Since demonstration, for Aristo-
tle, is a species of deduction, any statement which is suitable to occur in a
demonstration must also at least be suitable to occur in a deduction. But
such statements, as Aristotle develops in the Prior Analytics, must be of the
form, AxB, where A and B are terms (i.e., with A being the predicate-term
and B being the subject-term) denoting universals (i.e., species and genera)
and x corresponds to one of the four syllogistic relations that can obtain be-
tween terms (‘A belongs to all B’, ‘A belongs to no B’, ‘A belongs to some B’
or ‘A does not belong to some B’). In addition, statements that are eligible
to occur in a demonstrative syllogism, in Aristotle’s view, must also express
propositions that are necessarily true.us, I take it that, if a statement such
as “Being a house belongs to houses” really did assert an identity, it would
not be eligible to occur in a demonstrative syllogism, or even, for that mat-
ter, in a regular deductive syllogism. Of course, as I go on to discuss, given
Aristotle’s proposed re-interpretation, there is a way of understanding such
statements according to which they do not in fact assert an identity, but are
rather of the form, “One thing belongs to another (distinct) thing”. ese
statements are therefore at least in principle eligible to occur in demonstra-
tive syllogisms, provided that they can also be construed in such a way as to
satisfy the other requirements Aristotle imposes on such statements.
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In order to show that the metaphysical “why”-questions under consid-
eration in fact conform to the desired pattern, Aristotle proposes that we
understand the questions at issue in the following way:
[. . . ] [C]learly the question iswhy thematter is some individual thing,
e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the
essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, or this
body in this state, a man?erefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the
form, by reason of which the matter is some denite thing; and this
is the substance of the thing. (Met. Z 17, 1041b4–9)
ese reformulations of the “why”-questions at issue present us with a prima
facie diculty. For strictly speaking it does not seem correct to predicate
being a house or a humanbeing directly of thematter in question (e.g., bricks
and stones or a human body), since thematter atmost only composes a house
or a human being. In order to avoid this apparent mis-attribution, I propose
that we interpret Aristotle’s reformulations as follows. e question, “Why
does being a certain kind of thing (e.g., a house) belong to thematter at issue
(e.g., the bricks and stones)?”, should really be understood as asking why
the matter in question composes a thing of that kind. us, the question at
issue is not why a house is composed of bricks and stones (rather than some
othermatter); instead, the question iswhy somebricks and stones compose a
house (rather than some other kind of thing, e.g., a bridge). So understood,
Aristotle urges that the correct answer to these questions is: “Because the
essence of the thing is present in the matter composing it”.11
Given the explanatory role of denitions, a further complication would
result from reading Aristotle as directly predicating being a house or a hu-
man being of the matter composing the house or human being. For suppose
the matter composing a house or a human being is mentioned in the de-
nition which states what it is to be a house or a human being. (I return to
the issue of whether, and to what extent, Aristotelian denitions should be
read as containing a reference to matter briey below.) In that case, the as-
sumption that being a house or a human being can be directly predicated
of the matter in question, appears to lead to the following circularity: the
deniendum (viz., being a house or a human being) now seems to be itself
included in the deniens (viz., some suitable matter which itself is a house
or a human being and in which the essence in question is present). Given
my proposed interpretation, I do not believe that Aristotle in fact succumbs
11 is, in my view, is also the most sensible interpretation of the puzzling claim, to which
Aristotle seems to commit himself in certain places, that form can be predicated of matter
(see for exampleMet. Z.3, 1029a23–24). According to the reading I am proposing above,
we should understand this claim as requiring only that the matter in question composes a
matter-form compound in which the corresponding form is present.
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to this circularity worry. To see why this is the case, however, we must await
my brief sketch below of how I conceive of the role of matter in Aristotelian
denitions for the specic case of living organisms.
In addition, the passage just cited also reveals that Aristotle takes the
essence, i.e., the cause of each thing’s being what it is, to be the form of the
thing under consideration. e identication in question takes place in a
parenthetical remark at 1041b8 (cf., “but this is the form (touto d’esti to ei-
dos)”), which most commentators regard as a later insertion.12 e occur-
rence of “eidos” (“form”) in this passage also marks the only explicit appear-
ance of this term in all of Met. Z.17. Presumably, it is only once we have
arrived at the end ofMet. Z.17, the culmination of all ofMet. Z, that we are
entitled to conclude that the entity in question which best answers to the
relevant designations accumulated in this chapter (viz., “the essence”, “the
primary cause of each thing’s being what it is”, “nature”, “principle”, and “the
substance of the thing”) is indeed the form of a matter-form compound.13
To complete Aristotle’s response to the triviality objection cited above, it
still remains to be established that a thing and its matter are indeed distinct.
Aristotle argues in support of this claim by means of a regress-argument
which is given at the end of the chapter (see 1041b11–33) and which is meant
to apply to a particular class of complex entities, namely wholes which are
not “heaps” (so¯ros) but one (hen), i.e., unied.14,15 For the purposes of il-
lustration, Aristotle uses the syllable, “BA”, and esh as examples of unied
wholes. We can see from considering these cases, so Aristotle reasons, that
a unied whole and its matter are distinct, since it is possible for the syllable,
12 See for example Frede’s and Patzig’s (1988) comments on 1041b7–9 and, relatedly, 1041a27–
28.
13 We are thus meant to converge on the substantive conclusion at the end of Met. Z.17, as
the culmination of all ofMet. Z, that form is primary substance (see also Burnyeat 2001).
As briey outlined in Section 2.1, I favor the following construal of the claim that form is
primary substance: it is the substance of amatter-form compoundmore so than thematter
(using “substance” here in a relational, comparative and non-taxonomical sense).
14 us, even though we spoke earlier of “things”, in an apparently completely unrestricted
way, the main claims ofMet. Z.17 are really only meant to apply to a restricted class of en-
tities, namely unied wholes.at unied wholes are in fact correctly analyzed as matter-
form compounds, and in particular that there is more to them besides their matter, I take
to be the conclusion to which Aristotle’s regress-argument at the end ofMet. Z.17 is meant
to lead, rather than a premise to which we can simply help ourselves at the outset of the
discussion. Since Aristotle here contrasts unied wholes with heaps, we can also infer that
the main claims he takes himself to establish in this chapter are not intended to apply to
heaps: it is apparently not the case, then, that there is more to a heap besides a plurality of
elements.
15 My exposition here of Aristotle’s regress argument inMet. Z.17 will be brief, since I have
already commented extensively in other work on what I take Aristotle’s reasoning in this
passage to be (see in particular Koslicki 2006, 2008).
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“BA”, or esh to be dissolved into its material components, viz., the elements
(stoicheia) of which it consists (the letters, “B” and “A”; earth, air, re andwa-
ter). In this case, the unied whole in question (the syllable; esh) is gone,
but the elements of which it previously consisted (the letters; earth, air, re
and water) are still there.is possibility, so Aristotle argues, brings out that
there must be more to a syllable or esh besides the material components
or elements composing them: a “something else” (heteron ti). What could
this “something else” be? Aristotle considers three possibilities: either (i)
the “something else” is itself an element; or (ii) it is composed of elements;
or (iii) it is neither an element nor composed of elements.e rst and the
second case, Aristotle reasons, lead to a regress. As a result, he embraces the
third possibility.
e rst case. If the “something else” is itself an element, then we need
a new “something else” and hence are launched on a regress. For if the rst
“something else” is itself an element, then the uniedwhole (e.g., the syllable,
“BA”) is composed of the formerly identied elements (the letters, “B” and
“A”) plus the new element (the rst “something else”). But now, it seems, we
arrive in the same situation as before: the unied whole could be dissolved
into the elements which compose it, while the elements can persist through
this transformation. But then there must be more to the unied whole be-
sides the previously identied elements plus the new element.
e second case.e “something else” is itself composed of elements.16
But if the “something else” is itself composed of elements, then we again nd
ourselves in the same situation as before. For then there must bemore to the
“something else” besides the elements of which it is composed; and we again
need to posit a new “something else”, which accounts for the distinction be-
tween the unied whole and the elements which compose it.
e third case.e “something else” is neither itself an element nor com-
posed of elements.is is the position Aristotle adopts:
e syllable, then, is something—not only its elements (the vowel and
the consonant) but also something else; and the esh is not only re
and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else. [. . . ] But
it would seem that this is something (ti touto), and not an element
(stoicheion), and that it is the cause (aition) which makes this thing
esh and that a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is
the substance of each thing (ousia de hekastou men touto); for this is
16 As I have argued elsewhere (see Koslicki 2006, 2008), I read the second case as involv-
ing an application of the so-called Weak Supplementation Principle, according to which
a complex entity which has a proper part must have at least another proper part disjoint
from the rst one. If the “something else” is composed of elements, so Aristotle reasons
here, it must be composed of more than one element; otherwise, it is numerically identical
to the one element and the second case collapses into the rst case.
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the primary cause of its being (touto gar aition pro¯ton tou einai); and
since, while some things are not substances, asmany as are substances
are formed naturally and by nature, their substance would seem to be
this nature (phusis), which is not an element but a principle (arche¯).
An element is that into which a thing is divided and which is present
in it as matter (hule¯), e.g. a and b are the elements of the syllable.
(Met. Z.17, 1041b16–33)
Based on this regress-argument, Aristotle takes himself to have estab-
lished by the end of Met. Z.17 that there is more to a unied whole than
its matter. Assuming that the “something else” in question is indeed the
form, we therefore reach the conclusion that unied wholes are correctly
analyzed as matter-form compounds.is result supports Aristotle’s earlier
claim that the metaphysical “why”-questions he is investigating inMet. Z.17
indeed conform to the desired pattern, “Why does one thing belong to an-
other (distinct) thing?”, since we can now take these questions to be asking
of the matter composing a certain thing (e.g., the letters, “B” and “A”) why it
composes a thing of that kind (e.g., the syllable, “BA”).e triviality worry
raised earlier, in Aristotle’s mind, has thereby been successfully defeated.17
If we want to know what bears the primary responsibility for some matter
composing a certain kind of thing (e.g., a house, a human being, a syllable
or esh), Aristotle’s sides with the form, which he takes to be the entity an-
swering to the designations, “principle”, “nature”, “essence”, and “the primary
cause of each thing’s being what it is”. Given his motto for the chapter, “sub-
stance is a principle and a cause”, it is thus not surprising that the form of
a matter-form compound, in Aristotle’s view, is more deserving of the title,
17 Aristotle’s regress argument relies on the idea that the matter which comes to compose
a matter-form compound can in fact be separated (and not just conceptually) from the
matter-form compound itself which the matter in question comes to compose.e ques-
tion arises, however, as to whether Aristotle’s point concerning the separability of the mat-
ter from the matter-form compound transfers over from the merely illustrative case of ar-
tifacts to the real intended target of his argument, viz., natural things, in particular living
organisms. For, in the case of living organisms, Aristotle notoriously faces serious di-
culties in trying to isolate something which fulls the requirements he himself imposes in
Met. Θ.7 on what is to count as pre-existing or post-existing matter, i.e., which has what
it takes to be potentially, say, a human body without already composing something that is
actually a human being (cf.,Met. Θ.7, 1049a11–18). Perhaps in some cases, e.g., esh (one
of Aristotle’s examples in the regress argument), the matter can be straightforwardly sep-
arated (and not just conceptually) from the matter-form compound it comes to compose
once the form is present in the matter in question. Nevertheless, to ensure the across-the-
board applicability of the regress argument to the case of living organisms, Aristotle may
need to reconsider some of his other commitments which lead him to view artifacts and
living organisms in such a strongly disanalogous way.
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“substance”, than its matter.18
Asmy discussion of the regress argument has brought out, I read Aristo-
tle, in the second half ofMet. Z.17, as trying to establish (for the special case
of unied wholes, i.e., matter-form compounds) that a thing and its matter
are indeed distinct (“the distinctness claim”). Establishing the distinctness
claim, in my view, is required of Aristotle if he wishes to complete his re-
sponse to the triviality worry raised in the rst half ofMet. Z.17. One might
wonder, however, whether the regress argument is not also meant to accom-
plish other goals, viz., in particular the establishment of what we might call
“the unity claim”: that the form of a matter-form compound is the principle
and cause of its unity. If the second part of Met. Z.17 is in fact intended to
accomplish such additional goals, then the further question arises as to how
(if at all) the rst half ofMet. Z.17 contributes to this enterprise. Very briey,
I read Aristotle, in the second half ofMet. Z.17 as arguing merely that there
must be more to a unied whole besides the matter of which it is composed
and that the contrast between unied wholes and mere heaps can be traced
to the presence or absence of the extra ingredient he identies there (viz.,
form). But we do not nd, in the second half of Met. Z.17, any indication
of how Aristotle thinks form actually manages to establish unity within a
matter-form compound. And while, in other texts, Aristotle certainly at-
tempts to answer this question (see note 21 below), I have my doubts as to
whether his strategy of trying to solve the problem of unity for matter-form
compounds, as he does, by appeal to the actual-potential distinction is in
the end really successful. In connection with our more immediate concerns,
however, my reading of the regress argument does have the advantage of re-
leasing us from the obligation of having to explain how (if at all) the earlier
parts ofMet. Z.17 are meant to contribute to the alleged establishment of the
unity claim to which Aristotle evidently commits himself in the second half
ofMet. Z.17. Insofar as the dierent sections of the chapter can be viewed as
being centered on the establishment of the distinctness claim, the coherence
ofMet. Z.17 as a whole therefore becomes intelligible and straightforward.
18 is is not to say, however, that thematter of amatter-form compound does not qualify for
the title, “substance”, at all; only that it does so to a lesser degree than form. As I have briey
indicated, I interpret Aristotle’s designation, inMetaphysics ZHΘ, of form as primary sub-
stance (in addition to its being non-taxonomic and relational) as indicating a comparative
ranking, according to which form qualies as substancemore so than his other main can-
didates, viz., matter and the matter-form compound. However, this comparative ranking
is consistent with the idea that the other candidates under consideration also qualify for
the title, “substance”, to some degree, albeit less so than form. I take this to be the view
on which Aristotle converges as a result of his investigation into substance in the middle
books of theMetaphysics.
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But some lingering questions about Met. Z.17 as well as Met. Z. as a
whole remain: what justies Aristotle in assigning such a high level of pri-
ority to the form of a matter-form compound, in its role as a principle and
cause, over the matter? Aer all, we know from other texts (e.g., Phys. I–II)
that matter, in his view, also functions at least as a principle, a nature and
a cause associated with the matter-form compound, viz., itsmaterial cause.
InMet. Z.7–9, where Aristotle focuses on the diachronic processes of com-
ing to be, he emphasizes that both the matter and the form (along with the
agent, where applicable) must be presupposed in an explanation of the di-
achronic causal processes involved in producing a matter-form compound.
Moreover, there are reasons for thinking that, at least in certain cases, the
elements composing a thing must also gure in its denition: for example,
when we state what it is to be the syllable, “BA”, we must presumably men-
tion the letters, “B” and “A”, of which the syllable is composed, in addition
to the order in which they occur, viz., the fact that “B” precedes “A”.is
observation suggests that the matter composing a matter-form compound
might even be denitionally on a par with its form.19 Given these signi-
cant explanatory tasks, we begin to wonder whether the matter composing
a matter-form compound was not in fact unfairly downgraded by Aristotle
in his search for primary substance.
2.3 Met. Θ.8:e Priority of the Actual over the Potential20
e key to understanding how the causal priority claimwe encounter inMet.
Z.17 might be justied further is to appreciate its connection to the follow-
ing two positions Aristotle endorses elsewhere: (i) that form is related to
matter as what is actual is related to what is potential (seeDA II.1,Met. H.6)
and (ii) that actuality (energeia/entelecheia) in general is prior to potentiality
19 According to the reading I go on to develop below, the illustrative example involving the
syllable will turn out to contrast in signicant respects with Aristotle’s intended target
cases, viz., natural things and, in particular, living organisms. In the case of the syllable,
“BA”, it is plausible to think that the specic elements of which the syllable is composed,
viz., the letters, “A” and “B”, must be mentioned in the denition which states what it is to
be the syllable in question, along with the order in which these letters must occur when
they compose the syllable in question. In contrast, according to the approach I propose be-
low, the matter composing a living organism will not gure in the same specic way in the
denition which states what it is to be the kind of living organism in question. But I take
this contrast to point us precisely to one of the central reasons for Aristotle’s reluctance
to classify such things as syllables as full-edged substances (in the taxonomic absolute
sense).
20My discussion ofMet. Θ is very much indebted to (Makin 2006), even when the interpre-
tations I adopt diverge from his.
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(dunamis) (seeMet. Θ.8).21
In Met. Θ.8, Aristotle recognizes three senses of “priority”: priority in
denition (logo¯(i)); priority in time (chrono¯(i)); and priority in substance
(ousia(i)). He intends to establish there that what is actual is prior to what
is potential according to all three notions of priority, with one qualication:
there is a sense in which potentiality is temporally prior to actuality; but in
another sense, actuality is even temporally prior to potentiality.22
What is actual, in Aristotle’s view, is prior to what is potential according
to the rst sense of “priority”, viz., priority in denition, in that the potential
must be dened by reference to the actual, but not vice versa (1049b12–17).
Aristotle illustrates this point by appeal to the relation between a capacity
and the activity which results from the exercise of this capacity: someone
who has the capacity to build a house is potentially building a house, while
someone who is exercising the capacity in question is actually building a
house. In order to dene what it is to have the capacity to build a house
(i.e., to be potentially building a house), for Aristotle, we must appeal to the
corresponding activity (viz., to be actually building a house) which results
from the exercise of the capacity at issue. But the reverse is not the case: an
activity (e.g., to be actually building a house) is not dened by appeal to the
corresponding capacity (viz., to be potentially building a house).
We may not be completely persuaded, on the basis of this illustration,
that what is actual is in fact denitionally prior to what is potential, as Aris-
totle holds. What would be wrong with dening what it is to engage in a
certain activity (e.g., to be actually building a house) by reference to the cor-
responding capacity (viz., to be potentially building a house)? Aer all, a
builder is actually building a house, or so it seems, precisely when she is ex-
ercising the relevant skills involved in her possession of the capacity to build
a house. It thus appears as though, as far as denitions are concerned, the
21 InMet. H.6, Aristotle proposes that the apparent puzzle concerning the unity of thematter-
form compound is resolved once we realize that the form-matter pair is an instance of the
more general actual-potential distinction (1045a20–1045b7). A particular application of
this doctrine to the case of living organisms occurs in DA II.1, where Aristotle argues that
the soul (i.e., the form of the living organism) is the rst actuality of an organized natural
body (i.e., the matter of the living organism) that is potentially alive (412a16–b10). For
reasons of space, I cannot, in the present context, comment on the vexing question of how
exactly we are to understand Aristotle’s proposed solution to the unity problem. I simply
take it for granted here that (i) is indeed a position Aristotle wholeheartedly endorses.
22 For other texts in which Aristotle distinguishes between dierent senses of “priority”, see
also Cat. 12, Met. ∆.11 and Met. Z.1. It is an interesting interpretive exercise, in which I
unfortunately cannot engage here, to compare the three senses of “priority” we nd inMet.
Θ.8 with the distinctions Aristotle draws in these other texts. I do, however, briey com-
ment below on some of the connections I see between the three kinds of priority Aristotle
distinguishes inMet. Θ.8 andMet. Z.1, respectively.
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relationship between capacities and the activities which result from the ex-
ercise of these capacities is entirely symmetric. I will try to bring out below
why Aristotle thinks that, in the case of the matter-form distinction, what is
actual (form) is in fact denitionally prior to what is potential (matter).
Secondly, Aristotle argues that what is actual is prior to what is potential
in time in a qualied sense (1049b17–1050a3). Consider for example the re-
lation between a child (viz., something that is potentially a fully developed
mature human being) and an adult human being (viz., something that is ac-
tually a fully developed mature human being). In order for something that
is actually a fully developed mature human being to come about, something
that is potentially a fully developed mature human being (viz., a child) must
precede the adult human being temporally. In this sense, what is potential is
temporally prior to what is actual. However, children, as Aristotle remarks,
are in turn themselves temporally preceded by adult human beings (viz.,
their parents), who in addition are causally responsible for their creation.
In this second way, what is actual does temporally precede what is potential
aer all.
Again, we may wonder why the right conclusion to draw from Aristo-
tle’s remarks concerning priority in time is not that the temporal relation-
ship between what is actual and what is potential is entirely symmetric. As
Aristotle notes, what is potential is temporally prior to what is actual in one
sense, though what is actual is also temporally prior to what is potential in
another sense. How, then, does the temporal relationship between what is
actual and what is potential contribute to Aristotle’s overall thesis in Met.
Θ.8, that what is actual in general is prior to what is potential? We must as-
sume that Aristotle regards the temporal and causal priority of parents over
their children as somehow trumping the mere temporal priority of children
over the adult human beings into which they develop. It will come out more
clearly below how Aristotle’s priority claims inMet. Θ.8, as they pertain to
the matter-form relationship, should be construed as having causal force.
Finally, what is actual is said to be prior to what is potential according to
the third sense of “priority”, viz., priority in substance, in the following way:
But it is also prior in substance; rstly, because the things that are pos-
terior in becoming [i.e., in time] are prior in form and in substance,
e.g. man is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already
has its form, and the other has not. Secondly, because everything that
comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. the end. For that for the
sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the
sake of the end; and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of
this that the potentiality is acquired. For animals do not see in or-
der that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see.
And similarly men have the art of building that they may build, and
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theoretical science that they may theorize; but they do not theorize
that they may have theoretical science, except those who are learn-
ing by practice; and these do not theorize except in a limited sense,
or else they have no need to theorize. Further, matter exists in a po-
tential state, just because it may attain to its form; and when it exists
actually, then it is in its form. (Met. Θ.8, 1050a4–16)
It is easiest to illustrate the sense in which what is actual is said to be prior in
substance to what is potential by means of a diachronic case. Consider again
the relationship between a child (viz., something that is potentially a mature
human being) and an adult human being (viz., something that is actually
a mature human being). Even though the child is prior in time to the adult
human being intowhomhe or she develops (if all goes well), nevertheless, so
Aristotle maintains, the adult human being is prior in substance to the child.
For the adult human being, in Aristotle’s view, is that for the sake of which
(to hou heneka) the child undergoes these processes of development: it is the
goal, purpose or end (telos), the principle (arche¯) and actuality (energeia),
that is driving the child’s advancement from one stage of maturation to the
next.23
So far, my illustrations of Aristotle’s general priority thesis in Met. Θ.8
have focused on how this thesis applies to matter-form compounds, viz.,
living organisms. In the case of the builder, it is one and the same living or-
ganism who both possesses the capacity in question (viz., to be potentially
building a house) and engages in the corresponding activity (viz., to be ac-
tually building a house). Similarly, in the diachronic case, it is a single liv-
ing organism whom we encounter rst in an earlier and less fully developed
manifestation, as a child, and subsequently in a later and fully developed
manifestation, as an adult. But it is obviously very important to Aristotle’s
metaphysics as a whole as well as his teleological approach to the natural
world that the relationship between matter and form should also conform
to the general priority thesis he defends in Met. Θ.8. For one thing, the
application of the actual-potential distinction to the matter-form case has
already come up in the passage I cited just now to illustrate priority in sub-
stance (see 1050a4–16). In addition, Aristotle announces both at the outset
23 In fact, we canmake sense of how a not-yet-existent fully developed adult human being, in
Aristotle’s view, can drive the processes of development undergone by the child he or she
once was without having to resort tomysteriousmechanisms, such as backward causation.
(For helpful discussion of Aristotle’s teleology, see (Johnson 2005).) As will come out more
clearly below, it is really the form (viz., the child’s soul) that is already present in the child
from the time of conception to which Aristotle assigns the primary causal responsibility
for the child’s maturation into an adult human being. As we know from Phys. II, Aristotle
views both thematter and the form as internal principles and causes of change and stability
within a natural matter-form compound.
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and at the conclusion of the chapter that he takes actuality in general to be
prior to potentiality in all three senses of “priority”; and the form-matter
pair is clearly presented to us as one of the most signicant instances of the
more general actual-potential distinction.24 We thus expect form as well to
be prior to matter in all three of the senses of “priority” cited inMet. Θ.8. In
what sense, then, is it true to say of form that it is prior to matter in deni-
tion, time and substance?
In what follows, I propose an explicitly causal reading of Aristotle’s gen-
eral priority thesis inMet. Θ.8, as it pertains to the relation between matter
and form.25 In particular, I argue below that the priority of form over mat-
ter in denition, time and substance is best explained by appeal to the role of
form as the formal, ecient and nal cause of the matter-form compound,
respectively, while the posteriority of matter to form according to all three
notions of priority is most plausibly accounted for by the fact that the causal
contribution of matter is limited to its role asmaterial cause.
One might wonder whether the causal contribution of matter to the
matter-form compound is in fact exhausted by itsmereological contribution,
i.e., as that which at least partially composes the matter-form compound.
Very briey, it strikes me that Aristotle’s causal claim regarding matter (that
it acts as the material cause of the matter-form compound) must amount
to more than the purely mereological claim (that the matter at least par-
tially composes the matter-form compound). As we know from other texts
(e.g.,Met. Z.7–9 and Phys. I–II), Aristotle also emphasizes the role of mat-
ter both in the substantial and the non-substantial changes undergone by
matter-form compounds, as is illustrated (in the non-substantial case) for
example by the boiling of the blood in the case of anger and (in the substan-
tial case) by the fact that the pre-existing matter is that from which a newly
24 Aristotle begins his discussion of potentiality and actuality inMet. Θ by considering the
relation between capacities and their exercise in the rst half of the book (viz.,Met. Θ.1–5),
since he takes this application of the actual-potential distinction to be the clearest and least
problematic. In the second half of the book (viz.,Met. Θ.6–9), Aristotle extends the actual-
potential distinction to other cases, in particular the form-matter relation as well as the
relation between what is eternal and what is perishable.is list is by no means intended
to be exhaustive, however, since other subsidiary applications of the actual-potential dis-
tinction also crop up in various places. For example, Aristotle thinks of the innite and
the void as merely potential but not actual. See also (Frede 1994) for further discussion of
Aristotle’s notion of potentiality as well as his overall strategy inMet. Θ.
25 As I emphasize here, the causal reading of Aristotle’s general priority thesis in Met. Θ.8,
which I develop in what follows, is tailored to the specic case of matter and form. I want
to leave it open, for the time being, whether or how similar causal considerations could
help us understand the Met. Θ.8 priority thesis in its application to other intended in-
stances of Aristotle’s actual-potential distinction, e.g., the relation between the eternal and
the perishable.
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created matter-form compound comes to be by the agency of the ecient
cause. Some of the ways in which the role of matter within the matter-form
compound, despite its causal and compositional contributions, is neverthe-
less fairly described as limited will emerge below, though a fuller discussion
of these issues goes beyond what I could reasonably hope to accomplish in
the present context.
Once the causal interpretation of Aristotle’s priority thesis, as it pertains
to the matter-form relationship, is in place, we can then also see how the
work ofMet. Θ.8 is connected to the more specic and explicitly causal pri-
ority claim we encounter in Met. Z.17, viz., that form is prior to matter in
its role as the principle and primary cause of a matter-form compound’s be-
ing what it is. For my remarks in what follows can be used to unpack and
expand upon the very condensed causal claims that are already contained
within Met. Z.17, particularly at 1041a27–32 (cited earlier), where Aristotle
ascribes various causal roles to the essence of a thing and hence its form as
well, given the apparent identication of essence with form. In particular,
Aristotle there identies the essence of a thing as its nal and/or ecient
cause, depending on the case. Given the interpretive strategy I recommend,
we now have the option of reading these causal remarks in Met. Z.17 as a
kind of foreshadowing of what is to follow in Met. Θ.8, where the priority
of form over matter is subsumed under the more general three-fold prior-
ity of the actual over the potential. Given my proposed causal reading, the
denitional, temporal and substantial priority of form over matter, which is
supplied byMet. Θ.8 but absent fromMet. Z.17, serves to substantiate, and
provide the needed motivation for, Aristotle’s more specic and explicitly
causal priority claim inMet. Z.17.
InMet. Z.1, Aristotle already ascribes three kinds of priority to substance
(1028a31–1028b2): (i) priority in denition (logo¯(i)); (ii) priority in knowl-
edge (gno¯sei); and (iii) priority in time (chrono¯(i)).e most obvious dier-
ences between the three-fold distinctions we encounter inMet. Z.1 andMet.
Θ.8, respectively, are as follows. First, the two texts dier with respect to the
relata to which the priority relations at issue are attributed: according toMet.
Z.1, substance is said to be prior in three ways, presumably to non-substance;
according toMet. Θ.8, the actual is said to be prior to the potential in three
ways, with form and matter being a special case of the more general actual-
potential distinction. Secondly, the notion of priority in substance is (at least
not explicitly) mentioned in theMet. Z.1 passage.irdly, theMet. Z.1 pas-
sage distinguishes between priority in denition and priority in knowledge,
whileMet. Θ.8 appears to collapse these two notions into one, viz., priority
in denition.
ere are numerous reasons, however, why referring back to theMet. Z.1
132 The Causal Priority of Form in Aristotle
passage could not do the work of eshing out the details of the condensed
causal remarks we nd inMet. Z.17. For one thing, since theMet. Z.1 pas-
sage occurs at the very beginning of Aristotle’s investigation into substance
in Met. Z, it is at this point still very much an open question which type
of entity will be selected as the primary contender for the role of substance.
us, Aristotle could not, at this stage in the game, expect the reader to fol-
low him, if he were to attribute all three kinds of priority to essence/form
right away, since it is of course the task of the following chapters to lay the
groundwork required to substantiate this choice, which is thenmade explicit
only inMet. Z.17, at the end of his investigation into substance inMet. Z. Sec-
ondly, the causal language which is present inMet. Z.17 is completely lacking
from theMet. Z.1 passage.irdly, commentators have traditionally found it
very dicult to oer a satisfying reading of the three kinds of priority Aris-
totle ascribes to substance in theMet. Z.1 passage. In particular, Aristotle’s
reference to temporal priority inMet. Z.1 has proven to be especially chal-
lenging in this respect, and has prompted commentators to engage in some
rather adventurous speculation (as is documented for example in Frede’s and
Patzig’s (1988) comments on 1028a31–1028b2 and 1028a33–34). An existential
reading of priority in time, for example, is surely unavailable, since it would
saddle Aristotle with the implausible doctrine, to which he would not want
to commit, that substances exist in time before non-substances.26 In con-
trast, given my approach, the proposed connection between Met. Z.17 and
Met. Θ.8 opens the door to a relatively conservative reading of what Aris-
totle might have in mind when he attributes temporal priority to substance
in Met. Z.1. For, as I go on to argue in what follows, Aristotle’s notion of
temporal priority inMet. Θ.8, as it applies to the matter-form relationship,
should be read in terms of the role of form as the ecient cause of a matter-
form compound. is notion of temporal priority, which does not require
that the substances can or do exist in time before the non-substances, is then
available as an interpretive option forMet. Z.1 as well.
2.4 e Soul as Formal, Ecient and Final Cause
e relationship between the soul and the body of a living organism, as it
is described in De Anima and elsewhere, provides us with a detailed and
instructive example of how Aristotle distributes the causal responsibilities
within the compound between the matter and the form. For a living organ-
ism to be what it is, so Aristotle tells us (seeDA II.4, 415b13), is for it to live a
certain kind of life, namely one that is characteristic of the kind of organism
26 For further discussion of why existential readings of Aristotle’s ontological priority claims
more generally are unattractive, see (Corkum 2008), (Koslicki 2013), (Peramatzis 2008,
2011).
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at issue.27 Whatever is the cause of an organism’s living as it characteristi-
cally does therefore is also the cause of its being what it is. e majority of
this causal work, Aristotle argues, is shouldered by the form of a living or-
ganism, viz., its soul, which acts as the formal, nal and ecient cause of the
living organism (see DA II.4, 415b8–28).e matter of the living organism,
in contrast, viz., its body, contributes only by way of its role as the material
cause of the living organism.
e soul’s role as the formal cause of a living organism serves to bring
out the sense in which Aristotle regards form as being prior in denition to
matter. For whenwe inspect Aristotle’s method of stating what it is to belong
to the broad categories into which he divides living organisms (viz., plants,
non-human animals and human beings), we notice that in each case the cor-
responding denitions make reference to the kind of soul the living organ-
ism has. More specically, when Aristotle denes what it is to be a plant, a
non-human animal or a human being, he does so by referring to a certain
range of activities, and the corresponding capacities, which he regards as be-
ing characteristically associated with the living organism in question. In the
case of plants, he appeals to nutrition;28 in the case of non-human animals,
to perception;29 in the case of human beings, to thought.30 To be sure, in
27 It follows immediately from this correlation between an organism’s being what it is and
its living a certain characteristic life that there can be no such thing, for example, as a
dead human being. For nothing that is dead could have the same essence as a human
being, for Aristotle, since the denition which states the essence of, or what it is to be, a
human being requires that organisms of this kind live a certain kind of life, viz., one that
is characteristically human.
28 Aristotle conceives of the capacity for nutrition in a suciently broad manner to include
the capacities for reproduction as well as growth and decrease.
29 I adopt the reading oered in (Johansen 2012, Chapter 12), according to which an animal’s
ability to engage in locomotion follows from, but is not included in, the denition which
states what it is to be an animal. See also Met. Z.10–11 and the reading of these chapters
defended in (Frede and Patzig 1988). AtMet. Z.11, 103621, we see Aristotle struggling with
the question of how the ability of animals to engage in locomotion, and the concomitant
requirement to be composed of material parts that are suitable for this purpose, should
be reected in the denitions of animals. Frede and Patzig (1988, 212) propose that, while
the denitions of animals must bring out the “inner connection” between an animal’s soul,
the suitability of the bodily organs and the animal’s ability to engage in locomotion, the
denition itself makes reference only to the animal’s form, i.e., its soul.
30 Aristotle thinks of these capacities, and their corresponding activities, as arranged in a
series, in which each successive member presupposes the member preceding it, so that
whatever is able to engage in perception also possesses the capacity for nutrition, while
whatever is able to engage in thought also possesses both the capacity for nutrition and
the capacity for perception (see DA II.3, 414b28–415a12). See also (Frede 2008) on the re-
lation, and dierence, between perceiving (aisthanesthai), showing sense or being sensible
(phronein) and thinking (noiein). As we know from such passages asMet. A.1 and Poste-
rior Analytics II.19, Aristotle had inmind a kind of cognitive progression which takes as its
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each case (with the possible exception of thought), Aristotle holds that the
activity in question requires a material basis as well.31 However, insofar as
the body enters into these activities, it is relegated to an instrumental role
for the purposes of carrying out the tasks involved in the organism’s charac-
teristic way of life.32 e only requirements that are imposed on the matter
of which a living organism is composed is that it must be of a suitable type to
perform whatever activities are initiated by, and dened by reference to the
form, i.e., the soul of the living organism (see DA II.1, 412a28; II.4, 415b15–
21).
e question of whether or to what extent the matter composing a liv-
ing organism should be mentioned in its denition, i.e., the statement of
its essence, has been discussed extensively in the literature (see for exam-
ple Lennox 2008, Peramatzis 2011); and I can here only very briey hint at
a complex set of issues, a proper treatment of which would take us too far
aeld. Aristotle’s remarks in Phys. II.8–9 suggest that the matter compos-
ing a living organism only makes a very generic appearance in the denition
of the living organism, as is also implied by DA II.1, according to which the
matter composing a living organism is merely required to be of the right type
to carry out the characteristic activities associated with its particular kind of
soul. Beyond that, however, what counts as suitable in this connection is
determined by a specication of the form or telos of the living organism in
question.33
starting point the perception of particulars, and leads throughmemory, learning and expe-
rience to the more sophisticated and demanding intellectual abilities required for thought,
e.g., the ability to grasp universals, give an account and understand the rst principles
required for demonstrative knowledge (episte¯me¯) and the other intellectual virtues.
31 In the case of thought, Aristotle agonizes, for theological and other reasons, over the ques-
tion of whether and to what extent the body is involved as well in carrying out the activi-
ties relating to the intellect. If, in the case of human beings, thinking requires imagination
(phantasia), then this activity as well involves a bodily component at least indirectly, since
imagination, in Aristotle’s view, presupposes perception, which in turn clearly has a mate-
rial basis. For present purposes, we need not enter into the dicult interpretive question
of whether Aristotle in the end takes the intellect to be separable from the body. If he does,
then of course the corresponding denitions would make no reference to matter. Oth-
erwise, the same model applies to thought as to the other activities and capacities which
Aristotle clearly recognizes as being realized in matter (viz., nutrition, perception as well
as all the other capacities and activities which follow from them, e.g. locomotion, imagi-
nation, desire, sleeping, dreaming, etc.).
32 When Aristotle characterizes the natural body as “organikon” (e.g., at DA II.1, 412b5–6),
he is commonly understood as meaning, not that the body itself is an instrument or tool,
but rather that it comes equipped with parts which play this role. For further discussion,
see for example (Barnes 1999), (Bolton 1978) and (Bos 2003).
33 e soul’s role as the nal cause of the living organismwill briey occupy us further below.
Other key texts, in this connection, areMet. Z.10–11 (see Frede andPatzig 1988 for a reading
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Given the conception of the matter-form relationship I just outlined, we
can now also see how Aristotle can escape the circularity objection raised
earlier in connection with his apparent practice, inMet. Z.17, of predicating
being a house or a human being directly of the matter in question. I rec-
ommended there that such statements are best re-interpreted as requiring
only that the matter in question composes a house or a human being. Since
the matter composing living organisms makes it into the denition of the
living organism only in a very generic way, Aristotle does not succumb to
the worry that, say, the denition of human beingmakes reference to human
matter, thereby inadvertently smuggling the deniendum into the deniens.
For, according to the approach outlined here, to be a human being is to be
a living organism composed of a suitable body in which a human soul is
present, where what it is for the matter in question to count as “suitable” for
the purpose at hand is determined by reference to the relevant form, viz., the
human soul, and its associated capacities and activities.
Next, we can elucidate the sense in which Aristotle regards form as being
prior in time to matter by appeal to the soul’s role as the ecient cause of the
living organism. To illustrate this aspect of the soul’s causal contribution
to the living organism, it helps to consider rst an example from the realm
of artifacts. A builder, who in Aristotle’s view acts as the ecient cause in
the construction of a house, initiates a series of changes which (if successful)
lead to the end-result that a house-form comes to be present in some suitable
materials (e.g., bricks and stones). In this way, something that is actually
a house (viz., the newly created house) is produced by the ecient cause
(viz., the builder) from something that is potentially a house (viz., thematter
that is suitable to compose a house).roughout this process, however, the
builder is guided by a house-form which is already present in her mind to
begin with and which is like the house-form that comes to be present in the
bricks and stones as a result of the changes implemented by the builder. In a
successful case of ecient causation involving the production of an artifact,
form is thus prior in time to matter in this sense: before the newly created
matter-form compound can be produced, the ecient cause must already
be in possession of a form that is of the same kind as the form which comes
to be present in the matter as a result of the changes initiated by the ecient
cause.
Aristotle conceives of the soul as the ecient cause of the living organ-
ism in an analogous manner. To illustrate, consider a case in which a living
organism grows by adding more esh to its body as a result of ingesting and
of these chapters that is congenial to my approach). I discuss the connections between
essence/form and matter, which I take to be governed by hypothetical necessity, further in
(Koslicki 1997, 2012).
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digesting food. e role played by the soul in this case, in Aristotle’s view,
is comparable to that played by the builder in the construction of a house.
As the ecient cause, the soul initiates a series of changes both in the liv-
ing organism and in the food that is ingested and digested; these changes, if
successful, lead to the outcome that something that is actually esh (viz., the
esh that is added to the living organism’s body) comes to be from something
that is potentially esh (viz., the food that is ingested and digested) by the
agency of the soul. In the process, the soulmakes it the case that a esh-form
which is like the esh-form that is already present in the living organism to
begin with comes to be present in the properly transformedmatter (viz., the
concocted food). In this way, a successful case of ecient causation, in this
case as well, presupposes a form that is prior in time to thematter underlying
whatever changes are involved in a living organism’s exercise of its capacity
for nutrition.34
Lastly, in order to articulate Aristotle’s reasons for classifying form as
prior in substance to matter, we turn to the role of the soul as the nal cause
of the living organism. In this connection, it is useful to bear inmind the role
of the human soul in Aristotle’s specication of the good life for humans, as
it is set out in his ethical treatises. As is well-known, Aristotle argues in the
context of his so-called “function argument” (NE I.7) that the telos or good
for human beings resides in living a certain kind of life, viz., one in which
the characteristic activity or function (ergon) for human beings is carried
out well. In response to the question of what the function or characteristic
activity for human beings might be, Aristotle reasons that it cannot consist
in the exercise of a capacity that is exhibited by other living organisms as
well, viz., nutrition (which is common to all living organisms) or perception
(which is found in non-human animals as well). Rather, he proposes that the
good life for humans must involve the exercise of a capacity that is unique
to humans, viz., the capacity for thinking.35 Aristotle’s specication of the
34 I have illustrated the soul’s role as the ecient cause of the living organism here by means
of a particular case, viz., an exercise of the living organism’s capacity for nutrition. When
we attempt to work out how the soul is supposed to act as the ecient cause in other cases,
e.g., perception and thought, the details become quite tricky (see (Johansen 2012, Chapter
7) for useful discussion). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s claim that the soul is the ecient cause
of the living organism is meant to be completely general.
35 I regret that I can only provide a few brief gestures here in the direction of some of the
most important and dicultmaterial in the Aristotelian corpus. A detailed examination of
Aristotle’s function argument inNE I.7 can be found for example in (Barney 2008). For the
role of thinking, as a characteristic activity which distinguishes human beings from other
living organisms, see (Frede 2008). Relevant also in this context is Aristotle’s conception
of the divine intellect in Met. Λ as well as his discussion of the active intellect in DA III.
Such texts asMet. A.1–2, as well as the emphasis on theoretical contemplation in NE X.7–
10, suggest that human beings, for Aristotle, are at their best when the activities on which
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good life for humans thus proceeds directly by way of the human soul and
its associated capacities and activities. In this way, the human soul sets the
telos for human beings and acts as their nal cause. e human body, in
contrast, in its instrumental role, carries out whatever tasks are involved in
living a characteristically human life. By the criteria set out inMet. Θ.8, the
human soul is therefore prior in substance to the human body; and, more
generally, the form of a living organism is prior in substance to its matter.
According to the argumentative strategy I have taken in this paper, Aris-
totle’s causal claims (viz., that the formof amatter-form compound acts as its
formal, ecient and nal cause) are supposed to lend support to his priority
thesis (viz., that the form of a matter-form compound is prior to its matter
in denition, time and substance). One might be concerned, however, that
the causal claims and the priority thesis are somewhat mismatched in terms
of their respective relata: for the causal claims are apparently formulated in
such away that they relate the soul (i.e., the form) to the living organism (i.e.,
thematter-form compound), while the priority thesis is intended to apply to
the relation between the soul (i.e., the form or what is actual) and the body
(i.e., the matter or what is potential).us, even if we are convinced that the
form is in fact causally prior to the matter-form compound, why does this
causal priority translate into the causal priority of the form of a matter-form
compound over its matter?
Several possible avenues, which I can only briey outline here, are avail-
able in response to this apparent objection to my argumentative strategy.
First, the causal claims Aristotle advances in De Anima are in fact oen for-
mulated as relating the soul and the body (rather than the living organism),
and I have sometimes substituted the living organism for the body, as the
second relatum of these causal claims, when I have found it dicult to make
sense of these causal claims in their original formulations. Secondly, Aristo-
tle slides back and forth freely between the soul/body formulation and the
soul/living organism formulation of these causal claims. For example, atDA
II.4, 415b8–12, Aristotle states that the soul is the cause (aitia) and principle
(arche¯) of the living body according to three senses of “cause” and “princi-
ple” (viz., as what initiates change, as the end, and as the essence); but he
then goes on to illustrate the three-fold causal role attributed to the soul by
appealing to claims that are true of the whole living organism as well, and
not only, or not even primarily, of its body. Finally, although I suspect that
Aristotle would accept both formulations of the causal claims as well as the
priority claims, whether these claims take as their relata the soul and the
body, or the soul and the living organism, we have in any case already en-
their life centers most closely resemble those of the divine intellect. For further discussion
of the divine intellect, see for example (Burnyeat 2008).
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countered reasons (in Section 2.1) for taking thematter-form compound, for
the purposes of the inquiry into substance in the middle books of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, to be explanatorily posterior to its principles and causes, viz.,
matter and form.36
3. Conclusion
Mymain target in this paperwasAristotle’s causal priority claim inMet. Z.17,
according to which the form of a matter-form compound, rather than its
matter, bears the primary responsibility, in its role as a principle and cause,
for the compound’s being what it is. is priority assignment is at least at
rst sight puzzling, since Aristotle also allocates various causal duties to the
matter-form compound itself as well as its matter. Given the centrality of
Aristotle’s causal priority claim in his search for primary substance in the
middle books of theMetaphysics, it is important to understand what moti-
vates him in designating form as the primary cause and principle of a com-
pound’s being what it is.
According to the reading I have advanced in this paper, Aristotle’s causal
priority claim in Met. Z.17 is best evaluated by embedding it within the
broader context ofMet. Θ.8, where Aristotle argues that actuality (energeia/
entelecheia) in general is prior to potentiality (dunamis) in three ways, viz.,
in denition, time and substance. I argued that, when applied to the par-
ticular case of the matter-form relationship, the priority of the actual over
the potential should be read as having causal force. us, the priority of
form over matter in denition, time and substance is best explained by the
role of form as the formal, ecient and nal cause of the matter-form com-
pound, respectively, while the posteriority of matter to form according to
all three notions of priority is most plausibly accounted for by the fact that
the causal contribution of matter is limited to its role as the material cause
of the matter-form compound. When approached from this angle, the work
of Met. Θ.8 helps to substantiate, and provide the needed motivation for,
the more specic and explicitly causal priority claim Aristotle advances in
Met. Z.17: that form is prior to matter in its role as the principle and primary
cause of a matter-form compound’s being what it is.
For the specic case of living organisms, Aristotle’s priority claim is borne
out by the fact that he ascribes the majority of the causal work that is to
be accomplished within the matter-form compound to the soul (its form),
whereas the body (its matter) is relegated to a subsidiary and instrumental
role relative to the characteristic activities that are initiated by, and dened in
36anks to Umer Shaikh for pressing me on this point which certainly deserves a fuller
treatment than I am able to provide in the present context.
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terms of, the living organism’s soul. As the formal, ecient and nal cause of
the living organism, the soul, in Aristotle’s view, bears the primary causal re-
sponsibility for an organism’s living in a certain characteristic way and there-
fore also for its being what it is (given that, for Aristotle, a living organism’s
being what it is coincides with its living as it characteristically does). e
soul therefore, more so than the body or the living organism itself, ts Aris-
totle’s motto inMet. Z.17, viz., “substance is a principle (arche¯) and a cause
(aitia)”. If Aristotle’s reasoning is meant to extend beyond the case of living
organisms, analogous considerations could then be used to justify the causal
priority of form over matter and the compound more generally.
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